We are motivated by the tasking problem for UAVs in an adversarial environment. In particular, we consider the problem where, in addition to purely random noise in the observation process, the opponent may be applying deception as a means to cause us to make poor tasking choices. The standard approach would be to apply the feedback-optimal controls for the fully-observed game, to a maximum-likelihood state estimate. We find that such an approach is highly suboptimal. A second approach is through a concept taken from risk-sensitive control. For the third approach, we formulate and solve the problem directly as a partially-observed stochastic game. A chief problem with such a formulation is that the information state for the player with imperfect information is a function over the space of probability distributions (a function over a simplex), and so infinite-dimensional. However, under certain conditions, we find that the information state is finite-dimensional. Computational tractability is greatly enhanced. A simple example is considered, and the three approaches are compared. We find that the third approach is yields the best results (for such a case), although computational complexity may lead to use of the second approach on larger problems.
Introduction
For a discrete deterministic game, one can apply dynamic programming techniques to compute the value function (and "optimal" controls), defined over the state space. For discrete stochastic games, the value function is defined over the space of all possible probability distributions over the state space. Consequently, the problem is much more computationally intensive. Finally, for discrete stochastic games with imperfect observations, the problem is yet more complex, and even simple games and their information state formats become quite difficult to analyze.
We will be concerned here with a specific class of discrete stochastic games under imperfect observations. The choice of this class will be affected by both the intended application and computational feasibility considerations. The motivational application here is the military command and control (C 2 ) problem for air operations, with unmanned/uninhabited air vehicles (UAVs). See [2] , [5] , [16] , [21] , [28] , [31] , [24] , [25] for related information. This application has specific characteristics such that we will be able to construct a reasonable problem formulation which is particularly nice from the point of view of analysis and computation.
We first outline the mathematical machinery. The details of the development are discussed elsewhere due to paper length issues. After discussion of the algorithms, we apply the techniques on a seemingly simple problem in order to determine their effectiveness. We refer to the players in the game as Blue and Red, where the Blue player has imperfect observations. We compare three Blue approaches on this simple game problem. The most naive is for Blue to simply take the maximum likelihood estimate of the Red state, and to apply a feedback control at this system state. As one can easily imagine, this approach is open to exploitation by Red deception. The second Blue approach will apply a heuristic derived from the theory of Risk-Sensitive Control. This technique is more cautious in its use of observational data. The third Blue approach (a deception-robust approach) is through the direct solution of the imperfect information stochastic game. As one would expect, there is an improvement in outcome with the risk-sensitive and deception-robust approaches described herein when compared with the standard maximum likelihood/certainty equivalence approach (although there is a critical parameter in the risk-sensitive approach). On the other hand, there are significant computational requirements when using these new approaches.
Modeling the Game
We model the state dynamics as a discrete-time Markov chain. The state will take values in a finite set, X . Time will be denoted by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T }. We will consider only the problem where there are exactly two players. Blue controls will take values in a finite set, U , and Red controls will take values in a finite set, W . Given Blue and Red controls, and a system state, there are probabilities of transitioning to other possible states. We let P i,j (u, w) denote the probability of transitioning from state i to state j in one time step given that the Blue and Red controls are u ∈ U and w ∈ W , respectively. Also, P (u, w) will denote the matrix of such transition probabilities. We must allow for feedback controls. That is, the control may be state-dependent. For technical reasons, we will find that we specifically need to consider Red feedback controls. Suppose the size of X is n, i.e. that there are n possible states of the system. Then we may represent a Red feedback control as w ∈ W n , an n-dimensional vector with components having values in W . Specifically, w i =w ∈ W implies that Red playsw if the state is i. Define matrix P (u, w) by
Let ξ t denote the (stochastic) system state at time t. Let q t be the vector of length n whose i th component is the probability that the state is i at time t, that is the probability that ξ t = i. Then if Blue plays u and Red plays w, the probability propagates as
We suppose there is a terminal cost for the game which is incurred at terminal time, T . Let the cost for being in terminal state ξ T = i ∈ X be E(i), which we will also sometimes find convenient to represent as the i th component of a vector, E (where we note the abuse of notation due to use of E for two different objects). Suppose that at time T − 1, the state is ξ T −1 = i 0 , and that Blue plays u T −1 ∈ U and Red plays w ∈ W n . Then, the expected cost would be E[E(ξ T )] = q ′ T E where q T = P ′ (u, w)q T −1 with q T −1 being 1 at i 0 and zero in all other components.
We also need to define the observation process. We suppose that Red has perfect state knowledge, but that Blue obtains its state information through observations. Let the observations take values y ∈ Y . We will suppose that this observation process can be influenced not only by random noise, but also by the actions of both players. For instance, again in a military example, Blue may choose where to send sensing entities, and Red may choose to have some entities act stealthily while having some other entities exaggerate their visibility, for the purposes of deception. We let R i (y, u, w) be the probability that Blue observes y given that the state is i and Blue and Red employ controls u and w. We will also find it convenient to think of this as a vector indexed by i ∈ X .
We suppose that at each time, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . T − 1}, first an observation occurs, and then the dynamics occur. We let q t be the a priori distribution at time t, and q t be the a posteriori distribution. With this, the dynamics update of (2) is rewritten as
with controls u t , w t at time t. The observation, say y t = y, at time t updates q t to q t via Bayes rule,
Then (3), (4) define the dynamics of the conditional probabilities.
Risk-Averse Controller Theory
In linear control systems with quadratic cost criteria, the control obtained through the separation principle is optimal. That is, the optimal control is obtained from the statefeedback control applied at the state given by
A different principle, the certainty equivalence principle, is appropriate in robust control. We have applied a generalization of the controller that would emanate from this latter principle. This generalization allows us to tune the relative importance between the likelihood of possible states and the risk of misestimation of the state. Let us motivate the proposed approach in a little more detail. In deterministic games under partial information, the certainty equivalence principle indicates that one should use the state-feedback optimal control corresponding to state
where I is the information state and V is the value function [13] (assuming uniqueness of the argmax of course). In this problem class, the information state is essentially the worst case cost-so-far, and the value is the minimax cost-to-come. So, heuristically, this is roughly equivalent to taking the worst-case possibility for total cost from initial time to terminal time. (See, for instance, [20] , [17] , [22] , [29] , [30] .) The deterministic information state is very similar to the log of the observationconditioned probability density in stochastic formulations for terminal/exit cost problems. In fact, this is exactly true for a class of linear/quadratic problems. In such problems, the I t term in (5) is replaced by the log of the probability density, and a risksensitivity coefficient appears as well. Although we are outside of that problem class here, we nonetheless apply the same approach, but where now the correct value of this risk-sensitivity parameter is not as obvious. In particular, the risk-sensitive algorithm is as follows: Apply state-feedback control at
where q is the probability distribution based on the conditional distribution for Blue given by (3), (4) and a stochastic model of Red control actions, and V is state-feedback stochastic game value function (c.f. [13] ). Here, κ ∈ [0, ∞) is a measure of risk aversion. Note that κ = 0 implies that one is employing a maximum likelihood estimate in the state-feedback control (for the game), i.e.
Note also (at least in linear-quadratic case where log[ q t ] i = I t (i) modulo a constant), κ = 1 corresponds to the deterministic game certainty equivalence principle [17] , [20] , i.e. argmax{I t (i) + V t (i)}. As κ → ∞, this converges to an approach which always assumes the worst possible state for the system when choosing a control -regardless of observations. (See [28] for further discussion.)
Deception-Robust Controller Theory
The above approach was cautious (risk averse) when choosing the state estimate at which to apply state-feedback control. We now consider a controller which explicitly reasons about deception. This approach typically handles deception better that the riskaverse approach, but this improvement comes at a substantial computational cost. For a given, fixed computational limit, depending on the specific problem, it is not obvious which approach will be more successful.
Here we find that the truly proper information state for Red is I t : Q(X ) → R, where Q(X ) is the space of probability distributions over state space X ; Q(X ) is the simplex in ℜ n such that all components are non-negative and such that the sum of the components is one. We let the initial information state be I 0 (·) = φ(·). Here, φ represents the initial cost to obtain and/or obfuscate initial state information. The case where this information cannot be affected by the players may be represented by a maxplus delta function. The information state at time t evaluated at probability distribution q, I t (q), essentially represents the cost to the opponent to generate distribution q as the naive/Bayesian distribution in a Blue estimator. That is, through obfuscation of the initial intelligence and use of controls w r up to time t, the propagation (3), (4) would lead to some q at time t if such w r were known. I t (q) would be the maximal (worst from Blue perspective) cost to generate q by any Red controls that would yield that particular q at time t. Although Blue does not know the Red controls, it can nonetheless compute I t (·). For details on this propagation and theory, see [26] .
In the case here, where the state-space is finite of size n = #X , Q is some a simplex in IR n . Thus, I t belongs to a space of functions over an n − 1 dimensional simplex, and consequently an element of an infinite-dimensional space. However, in the cases where φ is either a max-plus delta function, or a piecewise-continuous function, I t is finite dimensional. This is crucial to the computability of this controller. Note that in either of these cases, the complexity of I t is proportional (in the worse case) to (#W ) t at the t time-step. Pruning strategies for reduction of this complexity are critical (c.f., [23] ).
We now turn to the second component of the theory, computation of the statefeedback value function. In this context, our value function is a generalized value function in that it is a function not only of the physical state of the system, but also of what probability distribution Blue believes reflects its lack of knowledge of this true physical state. The full, generalized state of the system is now described by the true state taking values x ∈ X and the Blue conditional probability process taking values q ∈ Q(X ). We denote the terminal cost for the game as E : X → R (where of course this does not depend on the internal conditional probability process of Blue). Thus the state-feedback value function at the terminal time is
The value function at any time, t < T , takes the form V t (x, q). It is he above minimax expected payoff where Blue assumes that q is the "correct" distribution for x at time t, that at each time Blue will know the correct q, and that Red will know both the true physical state and this distribution, q. In particular, q will propagate according to (2) , and the state will propagate stochastically, governed by (1). Loosely speaking, this generalized value function is the minimax expected payoff if Blue believes the state to be distributed by q r at each time r ∈ (t, T ], while Red knows the true state (as well as q r ). A rigorous mathematical definition can be found in [26] . The backward dynamic program that compute V t from V t+1 is as follows.
1. First, let the vector-valued function M t be given component-wise by
where q ′ (q, u, w) = P T (u, w) and the optimal w is
and note that the optimal u is u
3. With this, one obtains the next iterate from
and the best achievable expected result from the Blue perspective is
Consequently, for each t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T } and each x ∈ X , V t (x, ·) is a piecewise constant function over simplex Q(X ). Due to this piecewise constant nature, propagation is relatively straight-forward (more specifically, it is finite-dimensional in contradistinction to the general case).
The remaining component of the computation of the control is now discussed. This is typically performed via the use of the certainty equivalence principle (cf. [1] , [17] ), and we employ the principle here as well. To simplify notation, note that by (9) and (8), for any u,
Let us hypothesize that the optimal control for Blue is
In order to obtain the robustness/certainty Equivalence result below, it is sufficient to make the following Saddle Point Assumption. We assume that for all t, This type of assumption is typical in game theory. Although it is difficult to verify for a given problem, the alternative is a theory that cannot be translated into a useful result. Finally, after some work [26] , one obtains the robustness result: 
A Seemingly Simple Game
We now apply the above technology to an example problem in Command and Control for UCAVs. This game will seem to be quite simple at first. However, once one introduces the partial information and deception components, determination of the best (or even nearly best) strategy becomes quite far from obvious. In this game the Red player has four ground entities (say, tanks) and the Blue player has two UCAVs. The objective of Red player is to capture the high-value Blue assets by moving at least one non-decoy Red entity to a Blue asset location by the terminal time, T . Red can use stealth and decoys to obscure the direction from which the attack will occur, while the Blue player uses the UCAVs to destroy the moving Red entities. Red entities do not have any attrition capability against the Blue UCAVs. Blue UCAVs require at least two time steps to travel from one route to the other.
The simulation snapshot in Figure 1 , is taken after time step 2, from the graphic for a MATLAB simulation that runs the example game. Red is moving its currently surviving three entities (depicted as triangles) downward, while Blue is attempting to prevent any Red entities from reaching the Blue asset through use of its UCAVs (depicted as blue T's). Red is currently employing a decoy on the right, while using stealth on the left.
Winning and losing are measured in terms of the total cost at the terminal time. The cost at terminal time is computed as follows: each Red surviving entitiy costs Blue 1 point and if Blue loses the high-value asset, it costs Blue 20 points.
Comparison of the Approaches
Let us briefly foray into a comparative study between the naive approach (i.e., feedback on maximum-likelihood state), the risk-averse algorithm and the deception-robust approach for Blue. The critical component of the risk-averse approach is the choice of the risk level, κ. For the example studied in this chapter we vary κ between 0 and 10 to demonstrate the nature of the risk-averse approach in general. Firstly, for the case κ = 0, we have the risk-averse approach equivalent to the naive approach; apply the state-feedback control at the MLS estimate. As κ increases we expect the approach to achieve a lower cost for Blue, since it is taking into account the expected future cost V (X t ) (as a risk-sensitive measure). Note however that in the adversarial environment the effect of the Red player's control on the Blue player's observations has more complex consequences than that of random noise. As shown in the Figure 2 , the risk-averse approach gets the best cost for Blue at κ between 0.5 and 0.6 (note again that this choice will be problem specific). As κ increases beyond this point, the expected cost begins increasing, and has a horizontal asymptote which corresponds to a Blue controller which ignores all the observations and assumes the worst-case possible Red configuration. The bumpiness in the results is due to the sampling error (8000 Monte Carlo runs were used for each data point in the plot.) Also note that for large κ, the risk-averse approach does worse than the naive approach. For this specific example, the risk-averse approach does not achieve the same low cost as achieved by using the deception-robust approach.
